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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/05/2006

Accident number: 314

Accident time: 13:00

Accident Date: 07/06/2000

Where it occurred: Power lines North of
Rio Ligonha, Nampula
Province
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Country: Mozambique

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 09/06/2000

ID original source: GZ/AVS2001:MZ03

Name of source: HT (field): IND 132

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: M969 AP blast

Ground condition: hard
metal fragments
pylons and surrounds

Date record created: 20/02/2004

Date last modified: 29/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude: 38° 30' 18" E

Latitude: 15° 30' 50" S

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate medical provision (?)
inadequate equipment (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
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Accident report
The demining NGO involved made available their internal investigation report during 2001.
The report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

1. General
1.1 The electricity power lines north of the Rio Ligonha in Nampula Province were a regular
target for RENAMO sabotage during the Civil War. As a result, 34 of the high tension towers
on the section from Mucarre to Murrupula were protected from further attack through the
laying of a small protective anti personnel minefield around the base of each pylon. These
mines remain today, and are preventing EDM from carrying out essential repair and
rehabilitation works.
1.2 The Niassa Survey/UXO team deployed to begin a third phase of clearance around the
base of these towers on 17th April 2000. For task site location, see map copy at Annex A [not
made available]. At 13:00 on 7th June 2000 the victim accidentally detonated an explosive
device.
1.3 The internal accident investigation was conducted over 7/8th June and involved the
following personnel: Mozambique Country Manager, Mozambique Chief Administrator,
Mozambique Survey Officer.
1.4 As well as a detailed scrutiny of the accident site, interviews were conducted with the
following personnel: Niassa Survey/UXO Team Supervisor, Trainee Supervisor, Niassa
Survey/UXO Team Medic, Niassa Survey/UXO Team Deminer - victim)
1.5 Also present on the 8th June was a representative of IND who attended all interviews as
well as the accident site.

2. Events leading to the accident
2.1 The Survey/UXO team began a third phase of clearance of the task on 17th April 2000.
Each tower is suspected to be protected by up to 45 mines. These were laid in clusters of 8 to
10 around the base of each of the four legs. For this particular task, where there is the
possibility of causing further damage, all mines found are moved to a demolition pit located
away from the towers. By 7th June 2000, 531 M969 Portuguese anti-personnel blast mines
had been destroyed. 18 of the 34 towers had been cleared with work on-going at another five.
2.2 Tower 231 is situated 1400m west of the Rio Lalaua. The soil has a high laterite content,
and so the clearance was being conducted using a combination of detector and excavation
using an enxada. This is a standard method used by our group in Mozambique. By the 7th
June 2000, 21 mines had been found around the tower, with work still to be completed on the
remaining South West leg.
2.3 On 7th June 2000 the victim completed 5m of clearance which were checked by the
Team Supervisor. The victim then went on to clear a further 1.3m before indicating that he
had located a mine. The mine was lying on its side 30cm from the leg of the tower. The Team
Supervisor examined the mine before tasking the Trainee Supervisor to move the mine to the
demolition pit, during the 12:50-13:00 break period. At 13:00 the final 50 minute work period
began. The Team Supervisor observed the victim restarting excavation then began walking
away from the tower. When the Team Supervisor was 17m away, an unplanned explosion
occurred.

3. Treatment of the victim and subsequent evacuation
3.1 On hearing the unplanned explosion, the Team Supervisor (who was only 17m away),
immediately called by VHF radio for the ambulance and medic to move to tower 230. The
team supervisor then moved to assist the victim who was on his feet and staggering in the
cleared area under the tower. The victim was heard asking “where is my enxada, where is my
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visor? “. The Team Supervisor guided him from the area of the tower to the access road some
13m away. The Team Supervisor noted during a later interview that the victim was conscious
and remained quite calm throughout.
3.2 On hearing the unplanned explosion and subsequent VHF radio message the medic and
Trainee Supervisor moved towards tower 230 from their positions at the medical point and
demolition pit respectively. On arrival the medic performed the following actions.
Confirmed the victim’s level of consciousness and breathing (he was able to talk calmly).
Cleaned and dressed wounds to both hands.
Inserted a cannula, set up an IV giving set and began to administer 500ml of Ringers solution.
Administered 10mg of Nubain (pain relief drug) via the cannula.
Administered 10ml of Crystapen (liquid antibiotic) via the cannula.
3.3 At 13:03, the Country Manager and the Chief Administer arrived at the task Control Point
on a scheduled visit. They were told that an unplanned explosion had taken place by the team
driver, who subsequently drove 1000m to recover the victim. By 13:10, some 9 minutes after
the blast, the victim was loaded on a stretcher to the rear of a Land Rover 130 covered pick
up and left for Nampula Hospital. At 13:10, the Team Supervisor reported the accident in full
to headquarters in Nampula .
3.4 At 13:18 headquarters informed Nampula Hospital, by phone, the details of the accident
and informed them to expect the casualty. A Hospital Trauma kit was taken to the hospital by
our Survey Officer who awaited the arrival of the victim. At 15:25, some 2 hours and 24
minutes after the accident, the victim was handed over to the waiting medical staff at
Nampula Hospital. He was immediately examined by the duty medic. At 16:00, he was
examined by a doctor. At 17:00, he was released from hospital.

4. The accident investigation
4.1 The internal accident investigation took place over Wednesday and Thursday 7/8th June
2000. This involved a detailed study of the site, almost immediately after the casualty left for
the hospital, and on-site interviews and further site visit the following day. The visit on day two
was also accompanied by a representative from the IND.
4.2 The study of the accident site revealed that:

•

•

The nature of the victim’s injuries, the damage to his visor, the physical
evidence gathered around the seat of the blast and the history of the task all
indicate that he had inadvertently detonated an M969 anti personnel blast
mine whilst excavating ground with an enxada (hoe) at the front of his lane at
pylon 231.

•

Due to the close proximity of the steel leg of the pylon the victim had been
unable to use his detector to give any pre-indication as to the presence of
any suspect objects. Therefore he had been excavating using an enxada.
The ground was very hard and would have required the deminer to apply
greater than normal pressure in order to make any headway. The damaged
head of the enxada was encountered in uncleared ground some 6m from the
site of the blast. For details, see photos at annex C page C-1 [not made
available].

•

The previous mine found was lying on its side at the base of a large spoil
heap piled at the western edge of the pylon. The seat of the explosion was
30/40cm from the position of the previous mine (unusually close even for this
particular task).

The victim had been wearing his protective equipment (vest and visor) correctly. This
is backed up by the evidence of damage to the outside of both vest and visor and to
the minor injuries sustained by the deminer.

5. Conclusions in relation to the accident
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5.1 Based on the evidence gained from interviews, consideration of the accident
circumstances, and detailed assessment of the site, the following conclusions are drawn:
•

The M969 was struck on the pressure plate causing it to detonate. The mine
was lying on its side (in a similar manner to the previous mine found)
probably because it had been washed down the spoil heap by rain water. No
blame can be attached to the deminer or team. Our SOPs were at all times
adhered to.

•

The deminer’s injuries were considerably minimised due to the correct
manner in which he was wearing his protective vest and visor.

•

Having made an assessment of the casualty the team medics applied the
correct treatment before quickly moving the casualty to the hospital. The
hospital were correctly notified of a casualty and one of our “hospital bags”
was made available.

•

A clear accident report was made to Nampula headquarters at 13:10.
However, this was a full 8 minutes after the explosion had taken place. The
driver should have made a short initial situation report alerting HQ and all
other radio traffic that use of the radio should be minimised.

6. Summary actions
6.1 The underlying causes leading to the accident can be considered to be:
a) The close proximity of the metal leg of the pylon to the mine discounting the use of a metal
detector to give any advanced warnings.
b) The high spoil heap lying adjacent to the pylon which has over time had rain water run off
which has caused some mines laid on or around it to be displaced.
6.2 These circumstances draw into question the use of excavation around any towers
surrounded with unusually high or steep slopes. An alternative method must be found. Since
the immediate objective is to clear areas around the base of the towers in order to allow EDM
crews access to make emergency repairs, it is suggested that the spoil heap at tower 231 is
moved away from the base of the tower using our mechanical mine-clearance capability. The
spoil can then be marked and cleared at a later date.
6.3 Since [the demining NGO’s] well proven SOP’ were not by themselves the cause of the
accident normal demining should continue, though all senior operational staff should be
notified of the causes.
Signed: Country Manager Mozambique
Annexes referenced in the report were not made available.
The demining NGO were operating in one-man-teams, with the enhanced levels of
supervision that this entails. They routinely squat or kneel to excavate. The group always
wears a full-face visor and a short frontal apron when in mined areas.
An IND report was made available, but could not be copied. The accident code was
000985/Code 101. The map reference was recorded as: Lat: 15 deg 30' 50”S Long: 38deg
30'18”E
The victim was born on 1st January 1964.
The report included little detail, referring the reader to the internal accident report above. The
only aditional infromation was that equipment worth US$50 was damaged.
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Victim Report
Victim number: 396

Name: Name removed

Age: 36

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 3 hours

Protection issued: Long visor

Protection used: Long visor; Short
frontal vest

Short frontal vest

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Hands
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Unavoidable” because it seems that the victim
was working in accordance with his SOPs at the time of the accident. The secondary cause is
listed as a “Inadequate equipment” because the methods used and equipment available were
not appropriate, and the provision of appropriate equipment from detector to ambulance is a
management responsibility.
The deminer was obliged to use a full excavation method in hard ground using an enxada.
The use of some kind of pick-axe or hoe is not unusual when conducting area-excavation.
The tool is swung in at a low angle and used to shave the face of the excavation in a slow
advance. This is the second of three accidents involving this demining NGO and an enxada in
Mozambique. See the accidents on 14th April 1998 and on 7th July 2000.

A photograph of an enxada is shown above.
The failure of the group’s management to provide an on-site ambulance is surprising. The
victim was evacuated in a Land Rover and driven over bad roads for two hours and a half
hours. A full three hours elapsed before he was seen by a doctor. His injuries were very light,
but had they been heavy the means of evacuation could have been life-threatening.
The internal investigating team did not acknowledge that the group’s failure to provide a
dedicated on-site ambulance was a failing. It was “unusual” to the point of being almost
unique amongst professional groups in Humanitarian Demining.
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